Security schemes of pairwise key establishment, which enable sensors to communicate with each other securely, play a fundamental role in research on security issue in wireless sensor networks. A general framework for key predistribution is presented, based on the idea of KDC (Key Distribution Center) and polynomial pool schemes. By utilizing nice properties of H2 (Hierarchical Hypercube) model, a new security mechanism for key predistribution based on such model is also proposed. Furthermore, the working performance of tolerance resistance is seriously inspected in this paper. Theoretic analysis and experimental figures show that the algorithm addressed in this paper has better performance and provides higher possibilities for sensor to establish pairwise key, compared with previous related works.
Introduction
The security issue in wireless sensor networks has become research focus because of their tremendous application available in military as well as civilian areas. However, constrained conditions existent in such networks, such as hardware resources and energy consumption, have made security research more challenging compared with that in traditional networks.
Current research focus on such security schemes as authentication and key management issues, which are essential to provide basic secure service on sensor communications. Pairwise key establishment enables any two sensors to communicate secretly with each other. However, due to the characteristics of sensor nodes, it is not feasible to utilize traditional pairwise key establishment schemes.
Eeschnaure et al.
[1] presented a probablitic key predistribution scheme for pairwise key establishment. This scheme picks a random pool (set) of keys S out of the total possible key space. For each node, m keys are randomly selected from the key pool S and stored into the node's memory so that any two sensors have a certain probability of sharing at least one common key. Chan [2] presented two key predistribution techniques: q-composite key predistribution and random pairwise keys scheme. The q-composite scheme extended the performance provided by [1] , which requires at least q predistributed keys any two sensor should share. The random scheme randomly pickes pair of sensors and assigns each pair a unique random keys. Liu et al. [3] developed the idea addressed in previous works and proposed a general framework of polynomial pool-based key predistribution. Based on such a framework, they presented random subset assignment and hypercube-based assignment for key predistribution.
However, it still requires further research on key predistribution because of deficiencies existent in those previous works. Since sensor networks may have dramatic varieties of network scale, the q-composite scheme would fail to secure communications as a small number of nodes are compromised. The random scheme may requires each sensor to store a large number of keys, which would be contradicted with hardware constraints of sensor nodes. The random subset assignment would not ensure any two nodes to establish a key path if they do not share a common key. Though the hypercubebased assignment can make sure that there actually exist a key path, however, the possibilities of direct pairwise key establishment are not perfect, leading to large communication overhead.
In order to improve possibilities of direct pairwise key establishment, and depress communication overhead on indirect key establishment, we propose a H2 (Hierarchical Hypercube) framework, combined with a new key predistribution scheme. Moreover two new fault tolerance model and corresponding indirect pairwise key establishment schemes are also proposed, by applying nice properties on tolerance resistance H2 model has provided. The schemes has better working performance on probabilities of pairwise key establishment between any two sensors.
Preliminaries

Notations and Definitions
Definition1(key predistribution): Cryptographic algorithms are pre-loaded in sensors before node deployment phase.
Definition2 (pairwise key): When any two nods share a common key denoted as E, we call that the two nodes share a pairwise key E.
Definition 3 (key path): Given two nodes A 0 and A k , which do not share a pairwise key, if there exists a path in sequence described as A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ,……, A k-1 , A k and any two nodes A i , A j (0≤i≤k-1,1≤j≤k) share at least one pairwise key, we call that path as a key path.
Definition 4 (n-dimensional hypercube interconnection network): n-dimensional hypercube interconnection network H n (abbreviation as n-cube) is a kind of network topology that has the following characteristics: 1) It is consisted with 2 n nodes and n·2 n-1 links; 2) Each node can be coded with a different binary string with n bits such as b 1 b 2 …b n ; 3) For any pair of nodes, there is a link between them if there is just one bit different between their corresponding binary strings. Figure 1 illustrates the topology of a 4-dimensional hypercube interconnection network, which is consisted with 2 4 =16 nodes and 4·2 4-1 =32 links. And the nodes are coded from 0000 to 1111.
Related Works [1-3]
Polynomial-based Key Predistribution
In the scheme of polynomial-based key predistribution, the key setup server randomly generates a t-degree bivariate polynomial f(x,y)= over a , 0 finite field F q , Notes that q is fairly large prime number and for any variables x and y, f(x,y)= f(y,x) is always held. Then the key server computes a share of f(x,y), denoted as f(i,y) for each node, where i is assumed to be a unique ID for any sensor node. Every node is pre-loaded with its own share before node-deployment phase. Thus for any two nodes i and j, node i can compute the common key f(i,j) by evaluating f(i,y) at point j, and vice visa.
To predistribute pairwise key with such a scheme as addressed above, node i's storage overhead includes two parts: One is (t+1)log q storage space for storing a tdegree polynomial f(i,y), the other is the storage space for its own ID information. [4] shows that this scheme has ability of t-collusion resistant. That is, if there exists no more than t compromised nodes in the network, the scheme can ensure the pairwise key is secure between any two normal nodes.
Pairwise Key Establishment Scheme Based on H2 Model
As addressed above, polynomial-based and polynomoial-based schemes have some limitations. In this section we propose a new pairwise key establishment and predistribution scheme based on H2 model. The new algorithm is composed of three phases: polynomial pool generation and key predistribution, direct key establishment, and path key establishment.
Polynomial Pool Generation and Key Predistribution
Assume that there are N nodes in a wireless sensor network, where
is then generated and we construct a polynomial pool with the following method:
1) The key setup server randomly generates n*2 n bivariate t-degree polynomial pool over a finite fields F q ,denoted as F={ 1 2 /2 1 , ,...,
, are assigned to the jth dimension of the th hypercube in H2(n). , ( 2 1 i i
, are assigned to the ith dimension of the th hypercube in H2(n).
Imitating the step 1), it is easy to prove that there exists a pairwise key between A and B. 
Indirect Key Establishment
) and A are located in a / 2 n     -dimensional hypercube H, and node C and B are located in a
According to the properties of hypercube [5, 6] , there exist a path described as I 0 (=A),
Similarly, another path with the same property is existed in
Thus there exist a integrated path in H2 diagram from node A to B, described as I 0 (=A),
Theorem 5: Assume that any two nodes can communicate directly in a wireless sensor networks, and there is no compromised node in the networks, then there exist a key path for any node A( , ) and node B
Proof: According to Lemma1, there exist a path for any two nodes where d h =k in H2 diagram. Thus the conclusion is held.
We propose the algorithm for indirect key establishment as follows. Assume the two nodes A( , ) and node B(
) want to establish indirect pairwise key in the network, we propose the algorithm for indirect key establishment illustrated as follows. Indirect_Key_Establishing_Algorithm(){ 1) Node A computes a set L which records the dimensions in which node A and B have different sub-indexes. The set can be expressed as
2) Node A maintains a path set P with initial vale of P={A}.
3) Assume that U( , )
And 
If s<w, then s=s+1, and repeats step7); otherwise go on step10). 10) Let P=P {B}.  } According to Theorem 5, any node can compute a key path to it destination when there is no compromised node in the network. Once the path P is achieved, the two nodes can exchange secret information to generate pairwise key between themselves.
For example, the node A( (001), (0101)) and the node B( (100), (1100)) can establish pairwise key along the following key path: A( (001), (0101)) ((101), (0101)) ( (100), (0101)) ( (100), (1101)) B( (100), (1100)).
   
According to the algorithm described above, the following conclusion is naturally held.
Theorem 6: Assume that any two nodes can communicate with each other directly, and there is no compromised node in a network. If the distance between the two nodes is k, then there exists a key path with distance of k. That is, the two nodes can establish pairwise key through k-1 intermediate nodes.
Dynamic Key Path Establishment
The Indirect_Key_Establishing_Algorithm() illustrated in Subsection 4.3 can only deal with the situation that there is no compromised node in the network. However, in case of some existent compromised nodes, the algorithm would fail to find fungible intermediate node to help establish pairwise key.
We further analyze the example addressed in Subsection 4.3. When the node ( (101), (0101)) is compromised, the node A and B can utilize the following path to establish pairwise key: A( (001), (0101)) ( (000), (0101)) ( (100), (0101)) ( (100), (1101) (100), (1100)).
  
When the node ( (100), (1101)) is compromised, the two nodes can use the path: A( (001), (0101)) ( (101), (0101)) ((100), (0101)) ((100), (0100)) B((100), (1100)).
In case that the nodes ( (101), (0101)),((100),(1101)) are compromised, there still exists a key path denoted as A( (001), (0101)) ( (000), (0101)) ((100),(0101)) ((100),(0100))  B( (100), (1100) Definition 8 (k-dimensional local-weak-connectivity): A n-dimensional hypercube H n is k-dimensional local-weak-connected, if all reachable nodes in each k-dimensional sub-hypercube H k (k 1) of H n forms a connected graph, and the number of reachable nodes in H k is bigger than .
Figure 2 presents a 3-dimensional hypercube H 3 with two fault nodes and a 3-disconnected node. According to the above two kinds of local-weak-connectivity concepts, it is easy to prove that all reachable nodes in H 3 is global connected.
Global Connectivity of Local-Weak-Connected
Hypercube An n-dimensional hypercube H n has nodes, in which each node can be represented by a binary string and has n different links. So H n has n 2 n fferent links totally. Def than a alf of the be f t al es respectively. So, there exists reachable node a1 … a 1 , ak-connected, and there exists no other sub-hypercubes that include itself in H n . So, from definition 9, it is easy to know that H n is n-dimensional local-weak-connected. And in addition, from definition 8, we can know that all of the reachable nodes in H n form a connected graph.
Theorem p an t satisfy the conditions of the proposed two kinds of local-weak-connectivity, must be global connected. , ,..., , )
Dynamic Key Path Establishment Algorithm
And then key to node T is discovered. 
Algorithm Dynamic_Key_Path_Establishm
ppose that the /* su From definition 10, we can k-dimensional sub-hypercube that includes B is
*…*)).*/ 2) Initialize Path P: P  T; porary binary string C: 
,
ter the above ,.. , (
Joi the p will be tructed. */ cons n ath from node ( , 
, so the total tim en calWeak-Connectivity based Dynamic Key Path Establishment Algorithm is
Considering the e sional Lo networks, when applying the k-Dimensional Local-Weak-Connectivity based Dynamic Key Path Establishment Algorithm actually, we can set k=1,2,3. Then the total time complexity of the k-Dimensional Local-Weak-Connectivity based Dynamic Key Path Estab-GLWC Algorithm(){ Input: Sensor network H with fault nodes and fault smi lishment Algorithm will be ） （n  only. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of dimension n and the scale of the sensor networks.
General Lo
-based Dynamic_Key_Path_Establishing_ n links (The links, whose length are bigger than the tran tting radius). And two reachable nodes
s a c rwise turn to step 5);  ; 4)If P i orrect key path from A to B, then exit, othe 5)Compute and determine the node
s a c rwise turn to step 9); 
10 se that the -hy in /* From definition , we can suppo
2) Initialize Path P: P  T; e por 3) Initializ tem ary binary string C:
to Theorem 8, a pair of connected rea s n be found through discoveri chable node C and D ca ng in neighboring k-dimensional sub-hypercubes: 
All of the storage overhead address above sum up to n(t+1)log q+nt+n= n(t+1)log 2q bits. 
In the formal part of node's code, the probability o larly, the prob s also 1/2 in th f e i e ability of j e = ha i dif re dif
i latter code part. Thus the probability for the two nodes to ve fe nt subin the formal part is expressed as
. In the latter part, we also have:
rage communication overhead c Thus the ave an be L= the H2-based scheme is less than that in the hyperbe-based scheme.
Analysis adversary may compromise two nodes or prevent them to ) The adversary may focus its summarized as:
The average communication overhead in
Proof: According to the analysis on communication overhead addressed in Subsection 5.4 in [3], the result is certainly held. Figure 5 shows that the comparison on communication overhead between the H2-based scheme and the hypercube-based scheme.
Security
Here we put focus on two types of attacks against H2-based scheme: 1) An pairwise key between any stablish a pairwise key. 2 e power to attack against the whole network, for purpose of lowering the probability of pairwise key establishment, or in creasing communication cost. According to Theorem 6, the compromised probability of direct key establishment for any two non-compromised nodes is expressed as P link = P c  P H2 , in case that a particular polynomial f is compromised. Figure 6 shows the fraction of compromised direct between non-comrpomised nodes as a function of the number of comprom keys ised keys for H2 and hypercube-based schemes where N=30000 and t=2. Figure 6 sh that based on the assum tion of same network scale and the proportion of compromised nodes, H2 no il to establish direct key until the prop d d ows p -based scheme provides higher probability than hypercube-based scheme for direct key establishment between any two non-compromised nodes. H2-based scheme would t fa ortion increases to 40%, while for Hypercube-based scheme, accepted proportion is about 30%.
Attacks against Pairwise Key between Two Nodes
We further inspect the probability of compromised inirect key. As addressed in Theorem 6, the probability of irect key establishment for any two nodes is P H2  ( conditions of n figure also show ere overall security performance of the two schemes. We define the probability of compromised pa indirect key between any two non-compromised nodes is a function of the fraction of compromised nodes where N=30000 and t =2. Figure 7 shows that based on the same etwork scale and fraction of compromised nodes, H2-based scheme has better performance than hypercube-based scheme on indirect key establishment. The s that H2-based scheme would not fail to establish indirect key until the fraction of compromised nodes rises up to 60%. However, the fraction is only about 40% for Hypercube-based scheme. Figure 8 shows that the probability of compromised pairwise key is a function of the fraction of compromised nodes where N=30000 and t=2 for the two schemes.
From Figure 8 , we can know that the probability of the pairwise key between any two non-compromised nodes when the H2-based scheme is applied, is lower than that when the Hypercube-based scheme is applied, supposing that the scale and percentage o nodes of the sensor networks are the same.
So, from the above description, it is obvious that the security performance of the H2-based h -based schem .
